We examine the information content of quarterly earnings announcements in the syndicated bank loan market, a hybrid public/private debt market that is exclusively comprised of informed institutional participants. In contrast to the literature on equity price reactions to earnings announcements, we find that bank loan returns experience no significant response on earnings announcement dates. However, we do find significant price movements in the secondary loan market four weeks prior to earnings announcement dates, around the time of the monthly covenant reports to members of the syndicate. Moreover, we find that the information content in syndicated bank loan prices is most pronounced for borrowers with predominantly intangible assets that experience declining earnings. Thus, we find evidence that when earnings announcements convey relevant information about the borrowing firm (i.e., for informationally opaque firms with declining creditworthiness), the syndicated bank loan market expeditiously incorporates that information into prices.
1.

Introduction
In this paper, we examine the information content in earnings as reflected in changes in the prices to the holders of syndicated bank loans. We find no evidence that, at the time of the release of the earnings, there is any change in these private debt holders' perception of future cash flows, as reflected in a change in secondary bank loan prices at the time of the quarterly earnings announcements. However, when we examine the change in secondary bank loan prices from a period starting five weeks before the quarterly earnings announcement, around the time of the monthly covenant reports to all members of the syndicate, we find that there is a statistically significant decline in prices for those firms that are about to announce a decline in earnings. There is no similar effect for firms that are about to announce earnings increases. We interpret this finding to be consistent with the belief that holders of bank loans are able to more closely monitor the financial activities of the firm and so any information that might adversely affect the prospects of future loan repayments is expeditiously reflected in loan prices in the secondary bank loan market. Thus, participants in the syndicated bank loan market need not wait for the release of quarterly earnings in order to incorporate the information contained therein into loan prices.
The information content associated with the release of annual and quarterly earnings announcements has been extensively studied (see Bernard, 1989 and Kothari, 2001 for comprehensive reviews of this topic). The evidence is overwhelming that equity holders use earnings announcements to update their perceptions about the future cash flows of the firm. For a variety of institutional reasons, namely the lack of publicly available data and infrequency of trades, there is much less empirical evidence examining the impact of earnings announcements on debt prices. Even though debt makes up a substantial part of a firm's capital structure, the difficulties in getting unique prices and infrequent trading have limited the number of empirical studies. 1 Within the debt market, we loosely categorize debt into those issues where the Securities and Exchange Commission mandates a public prospectus, namely public debt, and debt where a prospectus is not required, namely private debt. We surmise that public debt holders have access to the same set of information, as do public equity holders, thus bondholders have incentives to utilize the information contained in earnings announcements. However, firm information flows differently to the private debt markets.
2 In this paper, we concentrate on the informativeness of quarterly earnings announcements to a portion of the private debt market referred to as the syndicated bank loan market.
We set out to investigate whether and when the secondary, or syndicated bank loan prices reflect information in quarterly earnings. Since these lenders may receive monthly covenant reports from borrowers reporting detailed financial and accounting information, the secondary market of syndicate loans has the opportunity to incorporate such information into the price at the time the monthly reports are released as well as at the time that quarterly earnings are announced. We further hypothesize that since lenders are exposed to downside losses, but do not share in upside gains (beyond the contractual repayment of interest and principal), it is conceivable that the loan market would be more sensitive to negative earnings information than to positive earnings 1 A noted exception to this general rule is Hanjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) that examines the impact of dividend announcements on public bondholder wealth. Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) examine changes in yield rates of publicly held bonds. 2 For a discussion of bank loans as privately placed debt, see Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998) .
information. Therefore, we expect an asymmetric price reaction in the secondary loan market.
We examine 11,034 quoted prices for syndicated loans from 196 firms for 2,127 quarterly earnings announcements over the period consisting of the last quarter of 1998
to December 2002. We utilize the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) marked-to-market dataset that contains weekly quotes on syndicated loans from various dealers in the secondary loan market. Using this database, we observe loan price changes prior to the announcement of each borrower's quarterly earnings releases, after controlling for relevant firm and loan characteristics that are expected to affect the impact of information about quarterly earnings announcements on loan returns. In general, we fail to find any price movements in the secondary loan market at the time of the release of the quarterly earnings announcement; that is, bank loan returns experience no significant price response at the time of the earnings announcement. However, we do find significant price movements in the secondary loan market approximately four weeks prior to earnings announcement dates, around the time of the monthly covenant reports to members of the syndicate.
We also show that the information leakage regarding upcoming quarterly earnings is asymmetric between good and bad news firms during the pre-announcement period. Bad news about earnings (i.e., declining earnings) is incorporated into bank loan prices as early as five weeks prior to the earnings announcement date, with the most significant movement occurs at four weeks prior to announcement. However, good news does not move prices as dramatically. These findings are consistent with the nature of the debt contract, which exposes the lenders to downside risk but shares no upside gains.
Finally, we find that the information content in syndicated bank loan prices is most pronounced for borrowers with predominantly intangible assets that experience declining earnings. These intangible firms are the most informationally opaque, and thus earnings information can be expected to convey the most information about the value of the firm's assets and the prospects for loan repayment. In contrast, earnings information would be less important in valuing loans issued by firms with tangible, hard assets that can be easily valued. Thus, we find evidence that when earnings announcements convey relevant information about the borrowing firm (i.e., when the borrower has intangible assets and declining creditworthiness), the syndicated bank loan market expeditiously incorporates that information into prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the secondary loan market and describes our data source. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. We discuss our regression model, variable measurement, summary statistics and the empirical results analyzing the information content of quarterly earnings in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Secondary Market in Syndicated Bank Loans
Large bank loans are often underwritten by syndicates of bank and non-bank financial intermediaries, led by a lead arranger or agent bank that organizes the syndicate and negotiates the loan terms. Bank loans tend to have unique characteristics. There is a large body of academic literature (see Boot, 2000) hypothesizing that "banks may know more about a company's prospects than other investors do," 3 thereby suggesting that banks have an information advantage in providing financing for firms. This stems from 3 See James (1987) .
their roles as delegated monitors, cultivated in the course of long-term banking relationships that include provision of a myriad of deposit, cash-management and lending services. 4 Moreover, bank loans are easier to renegotiate and restructure in the event of the firm's financial distress than are publicly traded debt instruments that typically have hundreds or thousands of uncoordinated bondholders that find it hard to reach agreement, at times required to be unanimous. 5 Thus, bank loans offer a certain amount of flexibility that is unavailable to issuers of bonds and other publicly traded debt securities.
Syndicated bank loans can be viewed as a hybrid between public and private debt markets (see, for example, Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000) . Oldham (1998) and Miller (1998) show that syndicated bank loans trade like bonds, with fully developed securitization tools, ratings, and a broad institutional investor base. However, the syndicated bank loan market can also be viewed as a private debt market. Syndicates are formed by lead arranging banks that typically have had a lending relationship with the borrower. Moreover, the covenant structure may entitle all members of the syndicate to the receipt of monthly financial updates detailing accounting data such as EBITDA, debt levels, free cash flows and net worth. Thus, syndicate members receive considerable amounts of private information about the financial condition of the borrower. Altman, Gande and Saunders (2003) find that the bank loan market is informationally more efficient than the bond market in terms of incorporating default information into prices. Casolaro, Focarelli and Pizzolo (2003) examine loan spreads and find that the percentage of the syndication held by the lead arranging bank is an important determinant of the information produced in the course of monitoring the activities of the borrower, suggesting that banks certify the quality of the loan by holding larger stakes. However, Allen and Gottesman (2004) find that when equity markets are relatively illiquid, equity markets are more informationally efficient than loan markets.
The Wall Street Journal (October 29, 2001 ) referred to the syndicated loan market as a "multi-trillion dollar debt bazaar that has become the nation's largest capital market during the last decade." 6 Many factors contributed to the rapid growth in the syndicated loan market during the 1990s. The advent of Rule 144a in 1990 (for a discussion of this rule, see Press and Weintrop, 1999) permitted the resale of privately-held securities.
Moreover, the 1991-1992 credit crunch, exacerbated by the adoption of more stringent, risk-based international bank capital requirements, contributed to the banking system's willingness to sell their loans into the secondary market, rather than hold them until maturity. Liquidity in the market was bolstered by the founding of the Loan Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA) and the adoption of standardized T+10 settlement procedures for par and near par loans. Thomas and Wang (2004) demonstrate that the leveraged loan market has been integrated into the high yield debt market since 1994, suggesting that the same factors that impact junk bond prices also impact leveraged loan prices. close to the mean of the mean bid and mean ask quotes (hereinafter, denoted the LPC mean of the mean). Thus, we use the LPC mean of the mean to determine the value of a particular loan facility, denoted P it for any given borrower i in any given week t.
We coordinate the marked-to-market database with loan descriptive data provided on LPC's Dealscan database of primary market data. 9 The Dealscan database contains detailed data about the borrower, the lending syndicate and the terms of the loan itself (including financial and general covenants, optionality in pricing, amorization schedules, lending purpose, etc.). After combining the two databases, we obtain a sample consisting of 1,639 unique loan facilities with 249 variables describing the terms of the loan facility, the borrower, the lenders, the composition of the syndicate and the pricing of the loan weekly over the June 1998 through May 2003 period.
8 LPC is a data warehouser, collecting daily price quotes from more than 30 dealers in the syndicated bank loan market and making them available for use in the marked-to-market database. We acquired a limited version of this database that includes weekly price quotations over the period of June 1998 to June 2003. Moreover, our observations are limited to those loan facilities with at least two quoting dealers. Our full database contains 184,710 facility prices. 9 See Dichev and Skinner (2002) for a discussion of the database.
We combine the LPC databases with quarterly Compustat data in order to obtain financial information about earnings, size and leverage. Imposing the requirement of
Compustat data availability further limited our sample to 878 loan facilities. In order for a firm to remain in the sample, we choose those firms in the combined LPC database with quarterly earnings announcements from Compustat, subject to the following criteria:
1. Each facility must have at least 25 time-series observations of quoted loan prices.
2. Only one facility per firm was selected to avoid interdependence among realized returns. The facility that was chosen has the longest time-series observations of quoted prices, i.e., it is the most frequently "traded" facility to reduce the infrequent "trading" problem associated with private debt.
3. There had to be at least one year of quarterly earnings announcement dates available from Compustat during the time period of the loan trades.
4. For each of the earnings announcements there had to be at least two quoted prices within our -6 week to +6 week return window, with 0 being the week of the announcement.
5. The weekly return on a leveraged loan index (the S&P/LSTA loan index) is available.
The selection process yields 11,163 firm-quarter observations. To control for the effects of extreme values, we remove those observations that are identified as outliers in the regressions. 10 We report our tests in the paper based on our final sample of 11,034
firm-quarter observations.
Hypotheses Development
The Timing of the Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements
There is a voluminous literature in both accounting and finance dating back to Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) that deals with the market's response to earnings announcements. The persistence of this finding is documented in Landsman and Maydew (2002) . They find no evidence of a decline in the information content of earnings announcements over the past three decades. Indeed, they find an increase in the informativeness of earnings announcements over time, as measured by abnormal stock price volatility and abnormal trading volume.
Since both debt and equity represent claims on the firm's assets, any change in investors' expectations of future cash flows will influence the pricing of debt, as well as equity, securities. Thus one could hypothesize that a similar earnings announcement effect would be reflected in debt prices as is found in equity prices. In a paper that tests the information content in public debt prices at the time of annual earnings announcements, Davis, Boatsman and Baskin (1978) Saunders (2003) compare the information content of trading in the syndicated bank loan market to the publicly-held bond market and find that the syndicated bank loan market is more informationally efficient than the market for publicly traded bonds.
A further difference in any reaction to information about the future cash flows of the firm relates to potential differences in the way that holders of debt versus equity respond to the same information. That is, debt and equity prices may respond differently to the same information. If, for example, the information reflects an increase in a firm's asset values, then both its debt and equity prices will tend to increase. However, if the information reflects an increase in the volatility of asset values, all else being equal, then debt prices will decline whereas equity prices will increase. The negative correlation of debt and equity prices to asset volatility stems from the short put option nature of debt (that is, debt holders issue a put option on the firm's assets to equity holders) as compared to the call option qualities of equity. Thus, ceteris paribus, debt values decline (increase) when volatility increases (decreases), whereas equity values increase (decrease) when volatility increases (decreases). Another reason why we might expect a differential informational impact of earnings announcements on debt prices as compared to equity prices is the market's differing informational efficiency. Although Blume, Keim and Patel (1991) and Cornell and Green (1991) find a strong contemporaneous relationship between bond returns and stock returns, Kwan (1996) suggests that stock markets are more informationally efficient than are bond markets.
Asymmetric Responses to Information About Earnings
Prior literature has posited that there may be an asymmetric price response between news that reveals a firm's deteriorating future economic prospects as compared to the price reaction to news that reveals a firm's rosy future economic prospects (Hayn, 1995) . However, extant equity-based research provides mixed findings on this issue. For example, by regressing raw returns on firm earnings, Hayn (1995) finds that the earningsreturns relation is much stronger for profitable firm-years than when all firm-years are included. However, Chambers (1996) reports that when sample firms are size-matched, firms with declining earnings tend to have a higher R 2 than do firms with increasing earnings. In replicating the tests of Hayn (1995) From a creditor's point of view, timely information about "bad news" is more important than information about "good news," since the value of creditors' claims on a firm's assets is more sensitive to a decline than an increase in the firm's future economic prospects (Smith, 1979) . Due to the nature of the debt contract, lenders are exposed to downside losses, but do not share in upside gains (beyond the contractual repayment of interest and principal). Therefore, we expect the information content of earnings in the secondary syndicated loan market to be asymmetric between firms that release earnings indicating negative future economic prospects (denoted, bad news) and those announcing increasing earnings (denoted, good news). More specifically, we expect syndicated loan returns to be more sensitive to bad news than to good news, thereby rejecting H 2.
The Impact of Earnings Information For R&D Intensive Firms
Our last hypothesis relates to the source of firm financing. Firms obtain financing from many sources -issuance of equity, preferred stock, (straight and convertible) bonds and other debt instruments, including loans from banks. Informationally opaque firms are likely to rely on bank loans for a portion of their sources of financing in order to benefit from the monitoring activities of the bank lender, as well as to obtain potential signaling advantages associated with loan approvals.
13 Diamond (1991) shows that borrowers tend to move from private resources to the public debt market when the quality of the firm's information improves. Pennachi (1988) demonstrates that when the benefits of sellers' monitoring of the loan become negligible, a loan can be sold in its entirety.
This is true for firms that are less informationally opaque, and therefore, can be evaluated using public information by arms-length investors.
13 See James (1987) and Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2004) .
In contrast, firms with large amounts of intangible assets are difficult for public capital markets to evaluate and monitor. With their relative paucity of hard assets and the proliferation of growth opportunities and other intangible assets on their balance sheets, intangible firms may be rationed out of public capital markets because of the potential for extreme moral hazard risk shifting resulting from information asymmetries. Often private debt, such as the bank loans and venture capital, are the only sources of capital available to these firms. Houston and James (1996) show that private debt represents 83% of outstanding corporate debt in their sample, with the majority of firms in their sample relying exclusively on private debt.
It is for intangible firms, however, that information is simultaneously most critical and least available. Thus, we hypothesize that the information content of accounting earnings is larger for firms in which intangibles comprise a large proportion of their assets. This is often reflected in R&D intensive industries. Following Barron et al.
(2002), we define R&D intensive firms to be high-technology manufacturing firms. The central characteristics of these R&D intensive firms is that they develop most of their intangibles (e.g., R&D) internally, and yet according to the current accounting standards, these intangibles have to be fully expensed, rather than capitalized on the balance sheet.
Compared with capitalization, full expensing of these R&D expenditures implies a higher uncertainty regarding whether and when the future economic benefits from these expenditures can be realized, which gives rise to the "opaqueness" of their financial information. This leads us to our last hypothesis.
H 3 : The information content of earnings in the syndicated loan market is the same for R&D intensive firms as for other firms.
The highly uncertain nature of intangibles, combined with the accounting treatment for these internally developed intangibles, makes it more difficult to observe and interpret the financial information for R&D intensive firms. Accordingly, the demand for timely information about these firms is larger, and so is the information content of accounting earnings. Thus we expect to reject H 3 .
The Empirical Model and Results
Variable Definitions
Loan Returns and Index Loan Returns
To test the hypotheses described in section 3, we define the following variables.
The dependent variable in our event study, R it , is the weekly return on each individual syndicated bank loan facility. We use weekly (mean of the mean) quotations obtained from LPC to obtain syndicated bank loan prices and calculate the raw return by taking the log difference of two consecutive weekly quotes. More specifically, our dependent variable R ,it is measured by the following:
where R it = the rate of return of syndicated loan facility i between the closing quote at week t-1 to the closing quote at week t, P it = quoted LPC mean of the mean price of loan facility i at week t. Starting in January 1999, the S&P/LSTA index provides weekly quotes on the leveraged loan market. To align loan index return with each individual loan return, we repeat the indexing procedure described above on the S&P/LSTA weekly index quotes, for each quarterly earnings announcement and for each firm.
Testing Variables
We examine the impact of the quarterly earnings announcement on the dependent variable, the weekly loan return R it . Following Beaver et al. (1997) , the quarterly earnings variable, denoted CE iqy , is the change in earnings for quarter q from the current year y to the year y-1, normalized by the level of earnings for quarter q in the year y-1.
We test the timing of the earnings announcement using an indicator variable, K it, that is set equal to one if the observed loan return for facility i in week t is K weeks prior to the earnings announcement week; zero otherwise. We observe loan price behaviors from five weeks prior to the earnings announcement (i.e., week K = -5) to the week of the earnings announcement (i.e., week K = 0). 16 Our primary interest is to find out how loan prices respond to the forthcoming earnings information during the five weeks of preannouncement period, i.e., whether there is information leakage during the preannouncement period in the private debt market.
Since we expect an asymmetric price reaction to earnings information, we split the sample into observations with an increase in the upcoming earnings announcement (denoted, good news) and observations with a decrease in the upcoming earnings announcement (bad news). Specifically, we separate good news firms from bad news 16 We start from week -5 because we don't have enough observations for week -6.
observations for each firm i using annual unscaled changes in earnings per share, as calculated from quarter q in year y-1 to the same quarter in year y; that is,
If the change in earnings is less than zero, then that firm-quarter observation is classified as bad news; otherwise, it is put into the good news sample.
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We are also interested in whether differences exist between intangible-intensive firms versus non-intangible-intensive firms in terms of the informativeness of syndicated loan prices. For firms with high amounts of intangibles, the information asymmetry is largest due to the nature and extent of uncertainty associated with intangibles (Lev, 2001 17 We use this definition of bad/good news (as in Foster (1977) and Kothari (2001)) because more complicated time-series models have not improved the results in other studies testing the relationship between short-window returns and quarterly earnings announcements. 18 For robustness checks, we also defined intangible firms to be those firms with a Tobin's q exceeding one and obtained similar results to those presented in the paper.
intangible (INTANGIBLE i = 1) firms, good news tangible (INTANGIBLE i = 0) firms, bad news (decreasing earnings) intangible firms and bad news tangible firms.
Other Control Variables
It is well known that firm size is negatively associated with stock returns (Schwert, 1983; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989 in the context of syndicated bank loans. To measure the liquidity of the syndicated bank loan market for facility i in week t, we define NOQUOTES it to be the log of the number of weekly quotes. Since loans trade at an illiquidity discount, the more liquid the loan (the higher the NOQUOTES it ), the lower the required rate of return.
An indicator variable DISTRESS it specifies whether the loan is distressed or not. It is set equal to 1 (zero otherwise) if the mean of the mean price of facility i in week t for a particular quarterly earnings announcement event is less than 80. During the time period of our study (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , many of the distressed loans in our sample are "fallen angels,"
i.e., par loans that declined in value as the borrowing firm experienced deterioration in its creditworthiness. This price decline would produce a negative relationship between loan returns and the DISTRESS it control variable. We also define a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the loan has financial covenants that might require special reporting of financial and accounting data, denoted COVENANT i . Finally, we use log of the size of the loan facility (LOANSIZE i ) to measure each loan's marketability. The larger the size of the loan, the more frequently the loan is expected to be traded, which is expected to be negatively related to the return of the loan.
The Empirical Model
We estimate the following model to examine the information content of quarterly earnings announcements in syndicated bank loan prices: Equation (2) is re-estimated six times for K = -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0 representing the week of the observed loan returns prior to a quarterly earnings announcement. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the 11,034 loan return observations. Panel A reports the summary statistics of the variables in the overall sample. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 1 , the average weekly return on the loan facilities in our sample as a whole is slightly negative over the sample period, and the average percentage change in quarterly earnings over the same period is -0.5433. Given that our sample period covers the Russian debt default, the bursting of the high tech bubble and the resulting recession in the US, syndicated loan prices generally declined over the 1998-2002 period. The average firm size in our sample is around 3.2 billion dollars, with the smallest firm's market capitalization of 0.7 million dollars and the largest of 103 billion dollars, which indicates that our sample firms are widely distributed in their sizes. In terms of industry classification, about 30% of the borrowing firms in our sample are in intangible-intensive industries. The average Tobin's q ratio for all firms in our sample is 0.9674. In terms of the loan facilities in our sample, 17.6% are distressed loans, 86.2% have financial covenants, and 88.3% of them are secured. The average loan spread is about 287 basis points over LIBOR, the average number of quotes is around 9, the mean maturity of the loans is slightly over 6 years, and the average loan size is around $560 million.
Descriptive Statistics
The most common financial covenant requires monthly reporting of EBITDA in order to calculate the borrower's debt to EBITDA ratio. In our full LPC database, 94.69% (out of a total of 1,148 loan facilities) of the loans specified a covenant limiting the maximum allowable debt to EBITDA ratio, with a median initial maximum allowable debt to EBITDA ratio of 5.50. Another common financial covenant (specified in 22.21%
of the loan facilities in the full sample) is a minimum net worth limitation (median value of $237.3 million).
Since we expect an asymmetric price reaction to earnings information, we split the sample into observations with an increase in the upcoming earnings announcement (denoted, good news) and observations with a decrease in the upcoming earnings announcement (bad news). As can be seen from Table 1 , the sample is rather evenly split: 6,003 observations in the good news subsample and 5,031 observations in the bad news subsample. We report the summary statistics of the loan observations in the bad news and good news subsamples in Panels B and C of Loan facilities in the bad news group tend to be larger, have greater liquidity (in terms of the number of quotations) and shorter maturity. They are less likely to be secured, to have financial covenants, but more likely to be distressed.
Empirical Results
To present an overview of our empirical results, in Figure 1 we plot weekly returns on syndicated bank loans in a return window of [-6 , +6] weeks around quarterly earnings announcements. A cursory review reveals that there is little or no significant loan price reactions to the corporate earnings announcement itself, but bad news (declines in earnings) are reflected in debt prices about a month before the earnings announcement date. There is no similar debt price reaction to good news (increases in earnings).
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Evidence in Figure 1 seems suggest that there is significant information leakage regarding the upcoming declines in earnings during the pre-announcement period in the 22 We conduct a similar test on raw equity returns at the time of the earnings announcement. As one would expect, there is a statistically significant increase in security prices at the time of the release of the earnings announcement.
secondary syndicated loan market. These illustrative results motivate us to proceed to the more rigorous empirical tests of our hypotheses.
We begin our formal tests with an estimate of equation (2) using panel data that is pooled both cross-sectionally and intertemporally. We include year indicator variables to allow the intercepts to vary by year from 1998 to 2003. 23 We estimate equation (2) for the overall sample of firms, as well as for various subsamples separately, in order to test our three hypotheses. Table 2 presents the estimation of equation (2) for the entire sample for each of weeks K = -5 to the week of the earnings announcement (K = 0) consecutively. Results in Table 2 indicate that the only week coefficient that is significant at the 5% level is -0.0006 for week K = -4, suggesting that there is a negative announcement effect approximately one month prior to the earnings release dates. Interestingly, we find that the coefficient on the K it dummy variable when week K equals 0 is insignificantly different from zero. This finding is quite different from the stylized fact in the equity market that earnings announcements are associated with significant stock market movements. We thus reject the null hypothesis H 1 that the information content of earnings announcements is reflected in bank loan prices on the announcement date. Due to the unique information flows in the syndicated bank loan market, the information about corporate earnings is reflected in bank loan prices approximately four weeks prior to the announcement. That is, private lenders know about earnings information earlier than other public security holders.
Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient on the loan rating variable is negatively significant in all of our regressions reported in Table 2 , which indicates that the higher the value of the RATING i variable, the lower the loan's credit rating, the higher the default risk, and the lower the weekly loan returns. Firm size and loan facility size are also significant negative, indicating that the larger the firm and the larger the size of the loan, the lower the loan returns. The log of the All-In-Spread variable, and the number of weekly quotes variables are significantly negative, consistent with our expectations that the more liquid the loan, the lower the returns.
However, the results in Table 2 are obtained for the aggregate sample, and therefore, cannot be used to test H 2 , which hypothesizes an asymmetric response in bank loan prices to good versus bad news. In Table 3 , we re-estimate equation (2) for the bad news and good news subsamples separately. 24 The insignificant coefficient on K it for week equals zero in both Panel A (bad news subsample) and Panel B (good news subsample) further supporting our conclusion that earnings announcements are not reflected in loan prices during the week of the announcement event (i.e., we reject H 1 ).
Moreover, none of the week indicator variables' coefficients are significant for the good news subsample, suggesting that there is no significant impact on loan returns resulting from increases in earnings. In contrast, however, the adjusted R 2 s in the bad news group regressions are 1.22% and larger, compared with those of less than 0.4% in the good news subsample regressions. More importantly, the coefficients on week K = -5 and week K = -4 are statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) for the bad news subsample, suggesting that declines in earnings are reflected in loan returns approximately one month (4 or 5 weeks) before the actual earnings announcement. The signs of both of these coefficients are negative, suggesting that loan returns decline one month prior to the announcement of earnings declines. This time period corresponds to the time frame during which bank loan syndicate members generally receive covenant reports that may include detailed financial information on earnings. Thus, when deteriorating financial information of the borrowers becomes available to private lenders, the secondary loan market expeditiously reflected that information into loan prices.
However, improving financial information about borrowers is not reflected in syndicated loan prices, suggesting that loan contracts generally expose lenders to downside risk, but not the upside gains. Therefore, our finding of an asymmetric reaction in loan prices to good versus bad news is consistent with the nature of the debt contract, which suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis H 2 .
Similar to the results in Table 2 , we find that log of firm size, loan rating as well as the number of weekly quotes of a loan are significantly negative in our bad news subsample. The financial covenant indicator variable is also negative significant, indicating that the existence of financial covenants obligates borrowers to reveal "bad" accounting data to the loan syndicate, which lowers the return of their loans. For good news firms, we find this covenant variable to be positive, consistent with the view that periodic "good" accounting information of the borrower reduces the uncertainty about its loan's market value, which slightly increases the loan returns.
Finally, we test hypothesis H 3 to see if there is an asymmetric impact on bank loan prices that depends on the level of tangibility of the borrowing firm's assets. In Table 4 , we estimate equation (2) As can be seen from Table 4 , none of the week dummy variables (for K = -5 to 0) are statistically significant for the good news groups (Panels C and D). However, the -0.001 coefficient on the variable indicating week K = -4 prior to the earnings announcement date is significant at the 5% level for the bad news/tangible firms (Panel B). Most striking, however, is that the week K = -4 and K=-3 coefficients are also significant at the 1% level for the bad news/intangibles firms (Panel A). Moreover, the absolute value size of the negative coefficients are larger (-0.0028 and -0.0021) than for the bad news/tangible firms (-0.001), suggesting a greater decline in loan returns for intangible firms experiencing decreases in earnings as compared to any other group. The coefficient on the size of the earnings decline, CE it , is statistically significant at the 10% level or better for the bad news/intangible firm group only, suggesting a further decline in loan returns for these firms. Thus, we find evidence that supports the existence of an asymmetric information effect of quarterly earnings announcements on bank loan returns for firms with intangible assets experiencing earnings declines. That is, earnings and other cash flow information are most important for informationally opaque firms with intangible assets that have financial difficulties. Our findings therefore reject the null hypothesis H 3 in favor of this asymmetric impact effect.
Conclusion
In this paper, we utilize quotations for syndicated bank loans in order to examine the information content of quarterly earnings announcements to private debt holders in the syndicated bank loan market. We find that this market reflects information about accounting earnings into loan prices approximately one month prior to its reflection in equity prices equity market. Moreover, we find evidence that bank loan prices are impacted by declines in earnings rather than increases in earnings, consistent with the nature of debt as exposed to downside loss, but with limited upside gain potential.
Finally, earnings information is most relevant and has the largest impact on bank loan prices if the borrowing firm's assets are intangible and therefore difficult to evaluate and monitor. Thus, earnings information is used by investors in the bank loan market to price syndicated loans when other sources of information are either unavailable or unreliable. [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] used in the overall firms' sample, and in both good/bad news firms, and the comparison between the two groups (good-bad). R it is the weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. MR t is return on S&P syndicated loan index in week t. CE iq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings measured by changes in earnings for quarter q from the current year to the prior year for firm i. SIZE iq is firm size, measured by the market capitalization (in millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for firm i. Intangible i is an indicator variable that takes the value of one is firm i is in an intangible-intensive industry, and zero otherwise. Tobin's q iq is measured by the market value of firm i's assets over its book value of assets at the beginning of the quarter q. RATING i is an indicator variable coded into 1 through 7 to represent Moody's senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B on facility i. SPREAD it is all-in spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees for facility i at week t. NOQUOTES it is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i at week t. DISTRESS iq is distressed loan indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less than 80 at week -5 of earnings announcement for quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANT i is an indicator variable that equals one if a loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECURED i equals one if a loan is secured and zero otherwise. MATU i measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of years from the loan origination to its maturity. LOANSIZE i is the size of the loan at its origination, it is expressed in thousands of dollars. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at or below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (T-test) or a one-tailed (F-test) test of significance. [-5,0] . Regressions also contain year indicators. T-tests are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values are calculated using White's standard errors. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at or below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (where sign is not predicted) or a one-tailed (where sign is predicted) test of significance. Notes: This table reports regression results for testing the information content of quarterly earnings on syndicated loan returns using pooled cross-sectional, time-series ordinary least squares for good/bad news firms over -5 to 0 weeks of each quarterly earnings announcement during 1998-2002 period, respectively. Good/Bad news firms are defined as whether change in quarterly earnings for the same quarter from year t-1 to year t is no less than/less than zero. R it is the weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. MR t is return on S&P syndicated loan index in week t. CE iq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings measured by changes in earnings for quarter q from the current year to the prior year for firm i. SIZE iq is firm size, measured by the market capitalization (in millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for firm i. Intangible i is an indicator variable that takes the value of one is firm i is in an intangible-intensive industry, and zero otherwise. RATING i is an indicator variable coded into 1 through 7 to represent Moody's senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B on facility i. SPREAD it is all-in spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees for facility i at week t.
NOQUOTES it is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i at week t. DISTRESS iq is distressed loan indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less than 80 at week -5 of earnings announcement at quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANT i is an indicator variable that equals one if a loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECURED i equals one if a loan is secured and zero otherwise. MATU i measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of years from the loan origination to its maturity. LOANSIZE i is the size of the loan at its origination, it is expressed in thousands of dollars. K it is a dummy variable that equal 1s if the observed loan return at week t of firm i is in K weeks prior to its quarterly earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. Regression is repeated for K= [-5,0] . Regressions also contain year indicators. T-tests are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values are calculated using White's standard errors. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at or below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (where sign is not predicted) or a onetailed (where sign is predicted) test of significance. Notes: This table reports regression results for testing the information content of quarterly earnings on syndicated loan returns using pooled cross-sectional, time-series ordinary least squares for bad/good news and intangible, bad/good news and tangible firms over -5 to 0 weeks of each quarterly earnings announcement during 1998-2002 period, respectively. Good/Bad news firms are defined as whether change in quarterly earnings for the same quarter from year t-1 to year t is no less than/less than zero. Intangible/tangible is classified by whether the firm is in an intangible-intensive industry or not. R it is the weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. MR t is return on S&P syndicated loan index in week t. CE iq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings measured by changes in earnings for quarter q from the current year to the prior year for firm i. SIZE iq is firm size, measured by the market capitalization (in millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for firm i. RATING i is an indicator variable coded into 1 through 7 to represent Moody's senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B on facility i. SPREAD it is all-in spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees for facility i at week t. NOQUOTES it is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i at week t. DISTRESS iq is distressed loan indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less than 80 at week -5 of earnings announcement at quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANT i is an indicator variable that equals one if a loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECURED i equals one if a loan is secured and zero otherwise. MATU i measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of years from the loan origination to its maturity. LOANSIZE i is the size of the loan at its origination, it is expressed in thousands of dollars. K it is a dummy variable that equal 1s if the observed loan return at week t of firm i is in K weeks prior to its quarterly earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. Regression is repeated for K= [-5,0] . Regressions also contain year indicators. T-tests are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values are calculated using White's standard errors. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denotes significance at or below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (where sign is not predicted) or a onetailed (where sign is predicted) test of significance.
